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ACCOUNTABILITY  FOR  NONENFORCEMENT
Urska Velikonja*
In recent decades, almost every new presidential administration has
come into office after having made campaign promises to deregulate some
area of social or economic activity.  Democratic candidates promise to lessen
the burden on those living in poverty, including limiting enforcement
against law-abiding undocumented immigrants.  Republican candidates
promise to lighten the regulatory burden on business: to pare back laws per-
ceived as excessively costly, to reduce environmental and workplace safety
standards, or to deregulate regulated markets.  The current administration is
no different.
Even large changes in enforcement can generally be defended as rea-
soned policy shifts, and protected from judicial review by Heckler v. Chaney,1 a
1985 Supreme Court decision that affords agencies considerable enforce-
ment discretion, so long as the change is not a prospective categorical pro-
gram of nonenforcement, such as President Obama’s immigration policies
(Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for
Parents of Americans (DAPA)).  This Article suggests that the choice
between discretionary nonenforcement, which courts cannot touch, and cat-
egorical nonenforcement, which they can, is not binary.  Enforcement priori-
ties can result in enforcement declines that are substantial, but not down to
zero, even in the absence of a public declaration of nonenforcement.  If the
availability of judicial review hinges on a public declaration of nonenforce-
ment, the doctrine has a built-in bias in favor of well-heeled, well-connected
classes of defendants.  When the universe of those affected by the nonen-
forcement policy is small, an agency can communicate such a shift quietly,
without a public declaration, and thus effectively immunize itself from judi-
cial review under Heckler.  An agency cannot do so when the universe of those
© 2018 Urska Velikonja.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.  For generous commentary
and suggestions, I thank John Nagle, Zachary Price, Hillary Sale, Ed Rock, symposium
participants at the Notre Dame Law School, the Tulane Corporate and Securities Law
Conference, and the Institute of Criminology at the Faculty of Law, Ljubljana (Slovenia).
All errors of law and fact are mine.
1 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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affected includes several million undocumented immigrants or a large mar-
ket of marijuana growers, sellers, and users.
But many significant shifts in enforcement are not categorical in the
sense that enforcement does not decline to zero.  Instead, enforcement
declines by a substantial amount, observable as a pattern of low-priority
enforcement.  Like a categorical program, large shifts in enforcement over a
short period of time are, in effect, similar to rule changes.  Unlike categorical
shifts, large changes in enforcement are immune from judicial review, and
should be immune.  Their adoption in the dark, however, is not consistent
with the ideas that underpin the rule of law, including transparency, predict-
ability, and accountability.
Changes in enforcement can move in more than one direction: enforce-
ment can increase significantly as the Securities and Exchange Commission
saw in the aftermath of the accounting scandals or the Madoff Ponzi scheme,
and decrease precipitously, as evidenced at the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau under Acting Director Mick Mulvaney.  There is no reason in
constitutional or administrative law to treat changes in enforcement policy
differently depending on whether enforcement increases or decreases.2  Pol-
icy choices raise similar questions about reviewability and accountability,
regardless of whether they increase or decrease enforcement.  They also raise
symmetrical questions about fair notice and due process and about the sepa-
ration of powers.  We demand that agencies give reasons for changes in rules;
reason giving seems appropriate for significant shifts in enforcement, in
order to match given reasons with observed enforcement practices, and to
subject those reasons to political scrutiny through media coverage and con-
gressional attention, even when judicial review is not available or
appropriate.
I. ALTERNATIVES FOR DEREGULATION
A. Three Options for Presidents Who Deregulate
Presidents can deregulate in a variety of ways.  First, a President with
solid support in Congress can implement a statutory agenda.  During his first
(and only) term in office, during which Democrats controlled both chambers
of Congress, President Carter passed the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,3
on the hope that competition would reduce ticket prices.  Second, a Presi-
dent can direct agencies to deregulate by adopting new rules that revoke
existing rules and regulations deemed costly or unfair.  Additionally, a Presi-
dent can, by executive order, impose roadblocks that make new regulations
less likely.  Finally, a President can deregulate by appointing department and
agency heads who will reduce enforcement of disfavored laws and regulations
2 At the same time, individual decisions to bring an action are not subject to the same
review as individual decisions not to bring an action.  Defendants can defend, whereas
individuals who are not targeted or victims of misconduct generally do not have a right to
sue.
3 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
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by directing their enforcement hands to do less, and thereby reduce the
impact of existing laws on regulated parties.
The three alternatives are substitutes, if imperfect ones.  New statutes are
difficult to adopt.  They usually require the President to enjoy majority sup-
port in both houses of Congress—a feat that ordinarily occurs only in the
first two years of an administration but not after that.  Even with full control
of Congress new statutes are difficult to adopt.  This is because statutes,
including deregulatory ones, face many layers of review, both inside Con-
gress, as well as in the media, and often in courts.  But the advantage of statu-
tory (de)regulation is that statutes are difficult to undo once adopted.
President Obama’s marquee achievement, the Affordable Care Act,4 is a case
in point: President Trump and the Republican Congress tried to repeal the
statute on several different occasions, only to fail each time.5
Deregulatory rulemaking faces considerably fewer political challenges,
and less media scrutiny, but is usually no easier to implement than a statute
because of significant procedural requirements.  Rules and regulations must
go through the notice-and-comment process required by the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).6  The process requires agencies to justify legal rules,
including showing that the social welfare benefits of a proposed rule out-
weigh its costs.  Moreover, the interested public has the right to participate in
the process and offer comments, to which the agency must respond.  In addi-
tion, economically significant rules proposed by departments and federal
agencies (except for independent agencies that include most financial regu-
lators) must be reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA), an agency that is closely associated with the White House and the
President of the United States.7  OIRA often requires substantial amend-
ments to proposed rules, and delays decisions on rules it dislikes, effectively
vetoing them.8  Even if a rule survives the many procedural steps, adopted
rules are subject to judicial review, where a court may vacate the rule for
failure to respond adequately to public comments or for failure to consider
the costs and benefits of adopted rules.9  There is no safe harbor for deregu-
latory rules or actions to rescind a properly adopted rule; they, too, must
4 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
5 See Rachel Roubein, TIMELINE: The GOP’s Failed Effort to Repeal ObamaCare, HILL
(Sept. 26, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/other/352587-timeline-the-gop-
effort-to-repeal-and-replace-obamacare.
6 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
7 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993).
8 See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law,
92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2014).
9 See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (invalidat-
ing an SEC rule because the Commission “inconsistently and opportunistically framed the
costs and benefits of the rule . . . and failed to respond to substantial problems raised by
commenters”).
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jump through all procedural hoops.10  A rule can be repealed by statute, but
statutes are difficult to adopt, as explained above.  As a result, repealing rules
is just as difficult as adopting new rules, if not more so.  A statute can pass
Congress even if Congress is uninformed and even if the costs of the amend-
ment outweigh its benefits.  The same is not true for agency rules.  Once a
rule has survived the notice-and-comment process, it is very difficult for an
agency to reverse course absent compelling evidence showing that the origi-
nal rule significantly underestimated the costs and/or overestimated the
benefits.11
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of successful deregulatory regulation
by the Trump administration in its first year has been pursuant to the Con-
gressional Review Act.12  The Act allows a new Congress to repeal rules and
regulations published late in the term of an outgoing administration through
an expedited legislative process.13
There is a third way to deregulate.  In recent decades, Presidents have
often resorted to nonenforcement as the preferred method to deregulate in
lieu of legislative or regulatory processes.14  The President, and by extension,
agency heads, can achieve deregulatory objectives through nonenforcement
without significant delays and without any real threat of judicial review, con-
trary to the very real roadblocks present in legislating and rulemaking.  This
is because the Supreme Court afforded agencies considerable enforcement
discretion for piecemeal enforcement decisions.  As long as a change in
enforcement policy is not prospective and categorical, it is immune from
judicial review.15  Similar to nonenforcement are soft agency policy positions,
such as guidance documents that can be reversed very quickly.16
Deregulation through nonenforcement may not outlast the administra-
tion but has very real consequences nonetheless.  In the first year of the
10 See, e.g., Open Cmtys. All. v. Carson, No. 17-2192, 2017 WL 6558502 (D.D.C. Dec.
23, 2017) (holding that the Department of Housing and Urban Development cannot sus-
pend a rule without following the required process).
11 Cf. RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10–11 (2008)
(explaining that neutrally applied cost-benefit analysis can be proregulatory, in particular
in environmental, health, and safety regulation).
12 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2012).
13 See Amber Phillips, Why Republicans’ 100-day War on Obama Is About to End, WASH.
POST (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/25/
why-republicans-100-day-war-on-obama-is-about-to-end/.
14 See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers,
112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1217 (2014); Daniel E. Walters, The Judicial Role in Constraining
Presidential Nonenforcement Discretion: The Virtues of an APA Approach, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1911,
1918 (2016). See generally Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 795 (2010).
15 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
16 See generally Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1755 (2013) (discussing approaches agencies have adopted to avoid or limit presi-
dential, as well as judicial, review).
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Trump administration, agency enforcement has declined across the board.17
Staffing changes at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Depart-
ment of Education, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have
resulted in laxer enforcement against polluters, for-profit colleges, and medi-
cal device manufacturers.18  Declines in enforcement have also permeated
into the financial regulatory agencies that historically have not faced such
cutbacks.  This development raises several interesting questions about appro-
priate accountability mechanisms.  The following Sections explore, in turn,
the legal requirements for enforcement and the history of deregulation
through nonenforcement.
B. The Duty to Enforce the Law and Enforcement Discretion
The Take Care Clause of the Constitution commands the President “to
put the laws into effect, or at least to see that they are put into effect, ‘without
failure’ and ‘exactly.’”19  The words “faithfully executed” do imply some
degree of discretion, but most commentators agree that the Clause estab-
lishes a presumption that Presidents will dutifully follow existing law, in con-
trast with the older English tradition of the executive suspending or
dispensing with enacted laws.20  Thus, the executive does not have the
authority to either “prospectively license statutory violations or to categori-
cally suspend enforcement of statutes for policy reasons.”21  By ignoring the
mandate to enforce the laws, agencies can nullify statutes, which is inconsis-
tent with the Take Care Clause and the separation of powers.22
At the same time, most would agree that the President and, by exten-
sion, federal agencies, have the authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion
and decline to enforce the law because equity considerations or resource
constraints prevent full enforcement.23  Courts routinely dismiss actions chal-
lenging agencies’ failures to enforce explaining that agencies’ individual
nonenforcement decisions are not reviewable or that the plaintiff lacks stand-
ing.  In Heckler v. Chaney,24 the best-known Supreme Court decision on non-
17 Cf. Lisa Rein & Andrew Ba Tran, How the Trump Era Is Changing the Federal Bureau-
cracy, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/how-the-
trump-era-is-changing-the-federal-bureaucracy/2017/12/30/8d5149c6-daa7-11e7-b859-fb
0995360725_story.html?utm_term=.5cb4ed7332b3.
18 Cf. Ralph Nader, Opinion, Trump’s Anti-Consumer Agenda Hurts His Voters, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/23/opinion/ralph-nader-trump-
consumers.html.
19 Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforce-
ment of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 799
(2013).
20 See Walters, supra note 14, at 1919.
21 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 704
(2014).
22 See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1113–14
(2013).
23 See, e.g., Walters, supra note 14, at 1924.
24 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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enforcement, the Court held that “an agency’s decision not to take
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review under
§ 701(a)(2).”25
The two views, the constitutional duty to enforce the law and the discre-
tion not to enforce, are somewhat in tension because the line between discre-
tionary nonenforcement, which is permitted, and categorical
nonenforcement, which is not, is quite blurry in the absence of a “smoking
gun”: a clear presidential or agency directive to not enforce.26  Without a
public announcement, it is unclear at what point failure to enforce amounts
to “abdication,” leading to challenges under Heckler, and whether failure to
enforce can operate as de facto revocation (i.e., desuetude).27  Ultimately,
for an administration averse to legal challenges and interested in a quick
change, Heckler makes the choice simple: so long as a time-limited change is
acceptable, nonenforcement is always superior to new rules or statutes.
Several scholars have argued that Heckler v. Chaney has been misunder-
stood: it does not grant agencies complete discretion to enforce, or not, any
law.28  Professor Zachary Price contends that nonenforcement amounts to
the usurpation of the lawmaking power and is constitutionally infirm.29  Pro-
fessor Lisa Bressman and, more recently, Daniel Walters have argued that
categorical nonenforcement is inconsistent with the APA’s requirement that
agency decisions be supported by substantial evidence and avoid arbitrari-
ness.30  They both note that one can read Heckler to argue that it forecloses
judicial review only in a limited set of particular discretionary nonenforce-
ment decisions.  According to the Court in Heckler, review would be available
where an agency “‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is
so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”31
Then, judicial review is appropriate: such a change is equivalent to a repeal
of a legal rule and thus should be treated the same.  The anti-abdication
exception is not large; it includes examples where the agency implemented
an enforcement guideline that disregarded the statutory command or where
it achieved the same result through a pattern of nonenforcement.32
The line between piecemeal and categorical nonenforcement has not
been carefully drawn.  The following Section reviews the history of nonen-
forcement, highlighting the different approaches taken by Democratic and
Republican administrations, and the different legal consequences.
25 Id. at 832.
26 That is, unless only publicly announced programs of nonenforcement, such as Presi-
dent Obama’s DACA/DAPA programs, are prohibited.
27 See discussion infra in Section II.C.
28 See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 38 (2008); Walters, supra note 14, at 1929.
29 Price, supra note 21, at 769.
30 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1678 (2004); Walters, supra note 14, at 1927.
31 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480
F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
32 Walters, supra note 14, at 1930–31.
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C. The History of Deregulation Through Nonenforcement
Presidents in recent decades have increasingly resorted to nonenforce-
ment as a substitute to deregulatory legislation or rulemaking.  Ronald Rea-
gan was elected with a mandate to deregulate.  Although much of his effort
was directed at reducing affirmative regulatory burdens by amending statutes
and requiring cost-benefit review for new regulations,33 President Reagan
was the first to use nonenforcement offensively.  While he did not attempt to
formally direct enforcement priorities, his administration sought budget
reductions in disfavored agencies that limited their capacity to enforce.34  As
a result, enforcement declined at the EPA, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) by seventy percent or more.35  Republican Presidents
that followed, George H.W. Bush and, to an even greater extent, George W.
Bush, relied more heavily on nonenforcement to further their deregulatory
agendas.36  Like Reagan, their efforts focused on disfavored agencies, such as
the Department of Labor, OSHA, the EPA, the FDA, and the Civil Rights
Division at the Department of Justice.37
President Obama, too, resorted to nonenforcement discretion when his
legislative efforts went nowhere in a hostile Congress.  Whereas Republican
administrations deregulated through nonenforcement by appointing agency
heads who were anti-enforcement, President Obama acted more transpar-
ently and directly, by sending a memorandum to agencies authorized to
enforce immigration and marijuana laws, and directing them not to enforce
certain legal provisions.  Both policies were publicly announced after years of
low-priority enforcement.38
President Obama’s marijuana policy received some support in Congress
after it was announced in the form of appropriations riders barring the DOJ
from using funds to prevent states from implementing their own, laxer mari-
juana policies.39  The immigration policy, on the other hand, was challenged
in court.  Texas and twenty-five other states successfully sued to enjoin the
second of the two deferred action programs, DAPA.  The district court, as
33 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981).  For a longer overview of the
history, see Zachary S. Price, Politics of Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119,
1125–26 (2015).
34 See Andrias, supra note 22, at 1059.
35 See Price, supra note 33, at 1126.
36 Kate Andrias, who served on President Obama’s White House staff, observed that
“[George W.] Bush exercised more extensive control over enforcement than did many of
his predecessors.”  Andrias, supra note 22, at 1061.
37 See id. at 1061–63.
38 See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 104 (2015); Robert A. Mikos, Medical Marijuana and the Political Safe-
guards of Federalism, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 997, 1002–03 (2012); Zachary S. Price, Reliance on
Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937, 953–54 (2017).
39 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 129 Stat. 2242,
2332–33 (2016); see also Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2015) (including similar restriction).
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well as the court of appeals, held that the program, due to its categorical
nature, was not merely an exercise of enforcement discretion but an action,
akin to a rule, and thus should have gone through notice-and-comment
review.40
And President Trump’s administration, like his Republican predeces-
sors, has been less willing to enforce laws it perceives as antibusiness, ranging
from environmental laws to consumer protection and fair housing.  This pat-
tern is not new.  Between 1948 and 1977, the National Labor Relations Board
remedial action decisions in the area of unfair labor were more pro-union
during Democratic administrations and more probusiness during Republican
administrations.41  Unlike his predecessors, Trump’s administration has also
retreated in enforcement by financial enforcement agencies.42  The differ-
ence between Trump’s approach and Obama’s, however, is that President
Obama deregulated through nonenforcement transparently, with a prospec-
tive announcement, whereas President Trump’s administration has done so
sub rosa, all the while publicly denying that enforcement policy and priorities
have changed.43  The legal challenge presented by the different approaches
is the fact that transparently announced policies can and have been chal-
lenged in court, whereas nontransparent ones have not and, as a general
matter, cannot.  The asymmetry creates perverse incentives for government
to be less transparent.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS FOR NONENFORCEMENT ALTERNATIVES
Under Heckler v. Chaney, case-by-case decisions not to enforce are not
subject to judicial review, while categorical abdications of enforcement are.
In between the two extremes is a large gray zone of low-priority enforcement.
Low-priority enforcement, or a change to low-priority enforcement, may
reflect a policy choice to allocate resources to different areas of activity that
are within agency discretion and not subject to judicial review.  It may also be
true of categorical nonenforcement, but without a smoking-gun public docu-
ment showing that the agency abdicated its responsibility to enforce the law.
I argue that, in theory, the latter is reviewable under Heckler v. Chaney.  In
practice, however, that may prove difficult.
40 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
41 See Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 197, 208 (1982).
42 Urska Velikonja, Behind the Annual SEC Enforcement Report: 2017 and Beyond
(Nov. 27, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3074073.
43 See discussion infra in Section II.B.
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A. Publicly Announced Nonenforcement
The Heckler v. Chaney decision, as well as the lower court’s decision in
Texas v. United States,44 is consistent with the notion that prospective nonen-
forcement policies are like broadly applicable rules and thus must follow the
notice-and-comment process.  The Constitution and the APA impose limits
on agency prosecutorial discretion, and this is one of them.  Even if one likes
the policies that DACA and DAPA express, the process for their adoption was
not proper.
A contrary holding in Texas v. United States would open the back door to
rulemaking that avoids all procedural and quality safeguards that have been
put in place.45  It would defeat the principles of separation of powers and
due process, not to mention the APA.  It would also be unwise, leading to
arbitrary outcomes.
To see how, let us analyze what would result if the opposite rule were in
place.  If categorical nonenforcement decisions were protected from judicial
review as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, individuals and entities
might obtain legal rights under the program with appurtenant due process
protections.  For example, a thirty-year-old without legal status in the United
States applies for a temporary work permit under DACA.  A few years later, a
new administration comes into office and unwinds the policy.46  There are
two possible results: (1) the thirty-year-old loses his work permit and poten-
tially faces deportation based on the information he supplied to the govern-
ment in order to obtain the work permit; or (2) the thirty-year-old enjoys the
legal protections of his entitlement to nonenforcement, barring the govern-
ment from using the information that the individual supplied.47  If the new
administration cannot implement option 1 because the promise of nonen-
forcement created legally enforceable reliance, it could, presumably, end the
program prospectively.48  This would create classes of individuals or entities
who are similar in every respect, except for the moment when they became
eligible.  But this is not about DACA alone.49  DACA is merely the latest man-
ifestation of an old problem.  Seemingly arbitrary disparities created by shifts
44 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by
an equally divided court sub nom. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
45 For a discussion of potential reliance interests by parties that rely on nonenforce-
ment, see Price, supra note 38.
46 I am assuming an administration always retains the right to undo a policy and that it
can undo under the same process as the process employed to implement it.  The assump-
tion is somewhat in tension with the claim that nonenforcement options are substitutes,
but not catastrophically.  Rules cannot undo statutes, and nonenforcement cannot undo a
rule permanently.
47 Because the work permits were, by design, temporary, I do not discuss the third
option, which would require the new administration to extend work permits, perhaps
indefinitely.
48 See generally Price, supra note 38.
49 See id. at 943–45 (discussing several cases in which courts credited parties’ reliance
on governmental assurances of nonenforcement and others in which courts refused to do
so).
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in enforcement policies push against the ideas of fairness, equality, and gov-
ernance by the rule of law.
B. Quiet Nonenforcement
A categorical change in enforcement policy can be announced publicly
and implemented by way of a publicly distributed memorandum, or quietly.
The former is subject to judicial review, whereas the latter is not, yet both
may give rise to legally protected reliance interests.50
There may be good reasons to treat publicly announced enforcement
policies differently from tacitly adopted ones.  The first is evidentiary: an
announced enforcement policy is easy to identify.  The second is that a pub-
lic announcement of noneforcement may engender reliance that, in turn,
can result in significant legal consequences, protected by due process.  It pro-
duces these effects quickly, often from the moment that the announced pol-
icy becomes effective.
But not every categorical change in enforcement is, or needs to be, pub-
licly announced.  Except for a single punitive enforcement action against
Wells Fargo for well-publicized abuses in auto and mortgage lending, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has not brought a single
enforcement action since Director Richard Cordray stepped down in late
November 2017 and Trump-appointee Mick Mulvaney took over as Acting
Director.51  By contrast, between April 1, 2016, and March 31, 2017, the
CFPB brought sixty-six enforcement actions and secured $11.9 billion in con-
sumer relief.52  The CFPB under Mulvaney has also dropped pending actions
despite vigorous objections by the enforcement staff.53  There has been no
public announcement that the CFPB would cease all enforcement, but regu-
lated parties can infer as much and proceed accordingly.54
Similarly, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) has stopped enforcing civil rights and fair housing laws.55  Since
Trump appointees took over, the Department has frozen enforcement
50 See id.
51 See Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfin
ance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2018).
52 See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FACTSHEET: CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU BY THE NUMBERS 1 (2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
201701_cfpb_CFPB-By-the-Numbers-Factsheet.pdf.
53 See Chris Arnold, Trump Administration Plans to Defang Consumer Protection Watchdog,
NPR (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/12/584980698/trump-administra-
tion-to-defang-consumer-protection-watchdog.
54 In February 2018, Mulvaney suggested that the CFPB would allow state attorneys
general to take the lead on enforcement more often. See Rachel Witkowski, AGs, Not CFPB,
Should Take a Greater Role on Enforcement: Mulvaney, AM. BANKER (Feb. 28, 2018), https://
www.americanbanker.com/news/ags-not-cfpb-should-take-greater-role-on-enforcement-
mulvaney.
55 Glenn Thrush, Under Ben Carson, HUD Scales Back Fair Housing Enforcement, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/us/ben-carson-hud-fair-
housing-discrimination.html.
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actions against local governments and businesses and sidelined officials who
were prosecuting civil rights cases.56  Despite major shifts, Secretary Ben Car-
son has vigorously denied that the Department has ceased enforcement of
antidiscrimination and fair housing laws.  He explained, through the Depart-
ment spokesman, that there was “no mission shift” and the changes were
“part of the routine recalibration undertaken from administration to
administration.”57
Without a public announcement, no legal challenge to the change in
enforcement policy appears likely, even if the rules of the game really have
changed for firms such as JPMorgan Chase58 or Citibank.59  Neither Heckler
nor Texas v. United States mandates that only publicly announced categorical
nonenforcement policy is outside the scope of prosecutorial discretion.  A
quiet decision not to enforce a statute or not to enforce violations by a class
of defendants is legally subject to the same constraints as a public one, and
should be reversed if challenged in court.  But, in reality, a quiet change may
not be challenged for a long time, if at all.  And even if it were, an agency
could plausibly argue that failure to prosecute is merely evidence of policy
shifts in the face of budget constraints.  At the same time, a quiet change that
was communicated to regulated entities or individuals may give rise to the
same due process and reliance interests as a publicly announced policy.  Even
if a publicly announced policy is not challenged in court, a new administra-
tion may quickly reverse the program.60  A quiet program, by contrast, will
neither be challenged in court nor reversed by a new administration, at least
until the new administration learns of it.
This produces an asymmetry: similarly situated parties are treated differ-
ently because one group is subject to a publicly announced categorical
change and the other to a quiet one.  More concerning is that the effects will
not be distributed equally.  President Obama did not publicly announce the
DACA memorandum because he generally operated transparently, though
he did; he did so to get the message out to almost two million individuals
who were eligible.  It is impossible to send out a message to such a large
group quietly.  By contrast, an agency such as the CFPB could send a quiet
message to regulated entities that all enforcement will stop.  To the extent
that publicity is relevant for whether an enforcement decision is challenged,
the rule against categorical nonenforcement has a built-in bias in favor of
56 Id. (reporting that frozen actions include “a half-dozen fair housing investigations
given the highest priority” under Carson’s predecessor in the Obama administration).
57 Id.
58 See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2017-CFPB-0015 (Aug. 2, 2017), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/5120/201708_cfpb_JPMorgan-Chase_consent-
order.pdf.
59 See Citibank, N.A., CFPB No. 2017-CFPB-0021 (Nov. 21, 2017), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/documents/5898/cfpb_citibank-n.a._consent-order_
112017.pdf.
60 See, e.g., Tal Kopan, Trump Ends DACA but Gives Congress Window to Save It, CNN
(Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/05/politics/daca-trump-congress/
index.html.
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small, discrete, well-advised, and often deep-pocketed groups.  As result, after
Texas v. United States, it appears unlikely that future administrations will seek
to adopt nonenforcement programs like DACA that would benefit thousands
or millions.  On the other hand, quiet nonenforcement that benefits small,
well-heeled groups would continue to flourish.
C. Low-Priority Enforcement
There are at least two types of low-priority enforcement that do not give
rise to the concerns expressed above.  But others do raise concerns of the
same kind as categorical nonenforcement.
Some statutes are honored in the breach because enforcement agencies
do not consider them terribly important.  At some point, regulated entities
and individuals may begin to rely on nonenforcement.  Laws that are not
enforced for an extended period of time may lack democratic support, mak-
ing enforcement unfair to the defendant.61  Federal courts have reluctantly
deployed the desuetude defense of due process, observing that the lack of
enforcement could be the product of limited budgets.  Prosecutors are
forced to choose how to use their resources,62 so lack of enforcement does
not necessarily imply a lack of democratic support for the unenforced stat-
ute.63  As a general matter, defense of desuetude requires a long period of
nonenforcement, at least a decade, but probably longer.64
Also, low-priority enforcement often reflects a choice driven by budget
constraints and policy priorities.  Budgets are nearly always painfully small
and agency enforcement heads possess considerable discretion in selecting
the targets of their investigations.  Policy shifts will often correlate with the
strength of policy preferences of agency heads and may shift considerably
from one administration to the next.  For example, SEC Chair Mary Jo White
came into office in 2013 announcing a crackdown on “broken windows” and
a wide-ranging examination of private equity.65  She ratcheted up enforce-
ment and faced congressional scrutiny for both the promise to crack down
and its execution.  White’s programs were a significant departure from the
baseline set by Chair Mary Schapiro.
The current SEC Chair Jay Clayton’s priorities, too, are a significant
departure from Chair White’s priorities.  The SEC is on track to reduce the
61 See Price, supra note 38, at 1016.
62 See Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-Wing Law Professors
Are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207, 2216 n.13 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUN-
STEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA
(2005)) (adding that prosecutions may be absent because no one violated the law or
because there was no evidence of violations).
63 The Supreme Court decided Lawrence v. Texas on liberty due process grounds, not
on desuetude, even though the sodomy statute that led to Lawrence’s conviction had not
been enforced.  539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003).
64 See Price, supra note 38, at 1018 (proposing a fifteen-year trigger).
65 See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Remarks at the Security Enforcement Forum (Oct. 9,
2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100913mjw.
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number of employees in the Division of Enforcement by 100 in fiscal year
2018,66 from 1377 to fewer than 1300.67  Under Clayton, the SEC has signifi-
cantly reduced enforcement against Wall Street financial firms.68  In the pre-
vious four years (2013–2016), under the direction of President Obama-
nominated SEC Chair Mary Jo White, the SEC secured settlements and mon-
etary penalties of at least $1 million against twenty-one, twenty-three, twenty-
nine, and forty-two Wall Street financial firms each year, respectively.69  Dur-
ing the first six months of President Trump’s administration, the SEC prose-
cuted six Wall Street financial firms: of those, five were carryover cases from
President Obama’s administration where either former Chair Mary Jo White
voted to bring the action or the firm agreed in a parallel DOJ plea deal,
entered before Trump’s inauguration, to settle with the SEC.70  There was
only one new action against a Wall Street firm that resulted in a settlement
that exceeded $1 million between Clayton’s appointment and the end of the
2017 fiscal year.71  In the subsequent four months, the SEC brought three
more such cases,72 a nearly seventy percent decline compared with the aver-
age rate from 2013 to 2016.
66 Fiscal year (FY) 2018 began on October 1, 2017, and will end on September 30,
2018.
67 Dave Michaels, SEC Signals Pullback from Prosecutorial Approach in Enforcement, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-signals-pullback-from-
prosecutorial-approach-to-enforcement-1509055200.  But see SEC, FISCAL YEAR 2018 CON-
GRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 13 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/secfy18congbudg
just.pdf (predicting a decline of thirty-four staff).  In part, the result is due to the hiring
freeze imposed on the federal government.  The decline is nonetheless regrettable given
that the Commission worked hard to increase enforcement staff since FY 2012, when it had
1219 full-time employees. SEC, FISCAL YEAR 2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 14
(2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy14congbudgjust.pdf.
68 The term “Wall Street financial firm” includes subsidiaries of public firms and pub-
lic holding companies, usually registered as broker-dealer or investment advisors, but also
in their capacity as transfer agents and intermediaries in other capacities.
69 All data on file with author.
70 See Velikonja, supra note 42; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, State Street
Corporation Agrees to Pay More than $64 Million to Resolve Fraud Charges (Jan. 18,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/state-street-corporation-agrees-pay-more-64-mil-
lion-resolve-fraud-charges (agreeing to enter into a deferred prosecution agreement and
pay $32.3 million to the DOJ and to offer an equal amount as a civil penalty to the SEC).
71 See Press Release, SEC, Barclays to Pay $97 Million for Overcharging Clients (May
10, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-98.
72 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 82,382,
Advisers Act Release No. 4831 (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/
2017/34-82382.pdf (settling to nonscienter violations and agreeing to pay a $13 million
fine); Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 82,054 (Nov. 13, 2017), https:/
/www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/34-82054.pdf (settling to nonscienter violations and
agreeing to pay a $3.5 million fine); UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10,433,
Exchange Act Release No. 81,974, Advisers Act Release No. 4803 (Oct. 27, 2017), https://
www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10433.pdf (settling to nonscienter violations and
agreeing to pay a $3.5 million fine).
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Unlike White, Clayton’s SEC has made no public statement that it would
reduce enforcement against large financial firms.  To the contrary: SEC lead-
ership denies that any change has taken place.73  The observed decline may
reflect a policy shift in enforcement priorities that is within the outer bounds
of prosecutorial discretion, or may be a categorical change in enforcement of
a set of rules, a step outside the protected space of prosecutorial discretion.
The public does not know, but that does not imply that the targets are in the
dark as well.  Well-advised by counsel with deep relationships at the Commis-
sion, regulated parties are certainly in the position to read the tea leaves.74
Categorical nonenforcement is prohibited by Heckler v. Chaney,75 but
large shifts in enforcement priorities are not—even when they lead to mas-
sive declines in enforcement.76  This produces an asymmetry.  Discretionary
nonenforcement decisions receive no judicial scrutiny, even when they lead
to very large declines in enforcement.  By contrast, massive increases in
enforcement do face judicial scrutiny—not on the level of policy, but each
individual defendant can challenge the agency’s action.77  Perhaps that is as
it should be, because nonenforcement does not threaten individual liberties
in the same way as enforcement.  To the extent that nonenforcement can
substitute for deregulation, the asymmetry produces a deregulatory bias
73 See Stephanie Avakian, Co-Dir., Div. of Enf’t, SEC, The SEC Enforcement Division’s
Initiatives Regarding Retail Investor Protection and Cybersecurity (Oct. 26, 2017), https://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-avakian-2017-10-26 (asserting that the SEC is not
directing fewer resources to the prosecution of financial fraud).
74 Nothing in this Article is meant to suggest that the SEC has, in fact, adopted a quiet
policy of categorical nonenforcement.  It relies on observable evidence of a significant
decline in the number of actions and the size of sanctions imposed on Wall Street firms.  A
couple of speeches Chair Clayton has made since his nomination suggest the shift: during
his confirmation hearing before the Senate Banking Committee, Clayton said he would do
what he can to root out “fraud and shady practices,” and bad actors from our capital mar-
kets. See Jay Clayton, Nominee for Chairman, SEC, Opening Remarks to the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Mar. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Opening
Remarks of Jay Clayton], https://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/640c2f54-
9c7d-47c2-8dc7-7d4debd6a13d/559D4F50EF7D195B8291094DA7490CA4.clayton-testi-
mony-3-23-17.pdf.
Clayton later explained what he meant by his statement that he would make sure to go
after the real fraudsters, but pare back enforcement and moderate the size of financial
penalties against firms whose employees commit securities violations, including fraud, but
where the firm does not benefit from the misconduct. See Dave Michaels & Andrew Acker-
man, SEC Chairman Nominee Jay Clayton Calls for Scaling Back Regulations to Encourage IPOs,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-nominee-jay-clay-
ton-says-past-wall-street-work-is-a-strength-1490281093 (adding that shareholders bear the
cost of financial penalties and expressing belief that “individual accountability drives
behavior more than corporate accountability”).
75 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
76 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 896–97 (1983) (arguing in favor of more relaxed
review of nonenforcement than of enforcement).
77 A larger share of defendants in follow-on actions contested their charges when Mary
Jo White was SEC chair than did when Mary Schapiro was chair.  Data on file with author.
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regardless of whether the law (not) being enforced is liberal or conservative.
An agency that wants to lower the cost of compliance for regulated parties
can do so by changing the rule or by not enforcing the rule—the ultimate




Due process may require judicial review of individual enforcement deci-
sions to protect the rights of individuals who are targets of enforcement, even
if we do not make such review available in individual decisions not to
enforce.  This asymmetry is unavoidable in our constitutional system.  But
there is no principled reason to favor changes in enforcement policy that
reduce enforcement over those that increase enforcement.78  Institutional
reform litigation may be past its heyday but could be useful against cases of
systematic nonenforcement.
But judicial review is not the only layer of review, particularly for policy
choices in enforcement that affect large groups of potential defendants.
Presidents may review enforcement policies.79  Announced shifts in enforce-
ment policy may be subject to public scrutiny on announcement.
Changes to enforcement priorities are not illegal.80  As explained in Part
I, legal precedents secure the agencies’ authority to direct enforcement dol-
lars as they believe is best.  But it is, or should be, a contestable choice.  Shifts
in enforcement priorities raise at least three concerns: welfare effects, notice,
and transparency that is a prerequisite for meaningful accountability.  Yo-yo
movements in enforcement are less than optimal from a social welfare per-
spective.  In order to ramp up enforcement in one area, an agency may cre-
ate a new task force, hire new or reassign existing employees, and train them.
Potential defendants respond by increasing compliance in areas of high
enforcement activity.  Four years later, the agency reassigns those same
employees to different tasks, and potential defendants increase compliance
in other areas of their business.  The effects of high enforcement may persist
for a little while, but dissipate over time.  Defendants may negotiate with the
agency strategically, knowing that a new administration would bring change.
Regulated parties may underinvest in needed reform knowing that their
investments may only produce returns until the next election.  Quick, and, in
particular, large changes in enforcement activity produce waste at the agency
and for the regulated parties.
78 But see Frank H. Easterbrook, On Not Enforcing the Law, 7 REG. 14, 16 (1983) (argu-
ing for more lenient review of nonenforcement and inaction, than agency action, on the
basis of individual autonomy); Scalia, supra note 76.
79 See Andrias, supra note 22, at 1033–35.
80 Potential defendants have no legally protected expectations that the law will or will
not be enforced with a certain level of intensity absent a public categorical declaration.
Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 48–50 (2017).
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The second concern is notice, specifically the lack of fair notice about
the change in enforcement.  When Mary Jo White ramped up enforcement at
the SEC, the defense bar complained about fair notice to their clients, even
invoking the rule of lenity in criminal cases.81  At the same time, decisions
not to enforce “advantages [the] interests . . . [of] the objects of regulation
but not the beneficiaries.”82  While judges have been receptive to the notice
arguments by defendants, they have not been as willing to hear the potential
victims.  Such disparities should be defended, not presumed.  It is not obvi-
ous why reliance expectations by defendants should be legally protected
while similar reliance interests by the beneficiaries of regulation should not.
Which brings me to the third objection: transparency.  For example, the
SEC chair might say that the Commission will police “broken windows”83 or
aim to root out “fraud and shady practices” and bad actors from our capital
markets.84  Both statements can be evaluated for effectiveness after allowing
a reasonable time for implementation.  But agencies have adopted significant
policy changes in the dark.  As described above, the CFPB no longer enforces
anything, and HUD no longer enforces civil rights and fair housing viola-
tions.  The SEC no longer seeks admissions from defendants it targets, and
has issued a waiver of automatic disqualification provisions to defendants
who settled 10(b) claims, something it has not done previously.85  These
changes in enforcement policy were implemented quietly.  Quiet changes
undermine agency credibility and increase “the potential for narrow interests
to obtain special treatment.”86  Selective nonenforcement, such as the appar-
ent decision to go easy (or easier) on large financial firms or payday lenders,
also raises the concern that it is an “attractive means of rewarding favored
81 Cf. Zachary Price, The Court After Scalia: The Rule of Lenity, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 2,
2016, 2:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-scalia-and-the-
rule-of-lenity/. See generally Anna Currier, Note, The Rule of Lenity and the Enforcement of the
Federal Securities Laws, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 79 (2015).
82 Bressman, supra note 30, at 1685; see also William W. Buzbee, Expanding the Zone,
Tilting the Field: Zone of Interests and Article III Standing Analysis After Bennett v. Spear, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 763, 770 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 186–88 (1992).
83 Policing “broken windows” was one of SEC Chair Mary Jo White’s early enforcement
priorities. See White, supra note 65.
84 See Opening Remarks of Jay Clayton, supra note 74.
85 See Letter from Elizabeth M. Murphy, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, to David
S. Huntington, Attorney, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP (May 22, 2017)
[hereinafter Murphy Letter], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2017/
cooperman-052217-506d.pdf; see also Letter from David S. Huntington, Attorney, Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, to Sebastian Gomez Abero, Chief of the Office of
Small Bus. Policy, SEC (May 18, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noac-
tion/2017/cooperman-052217-506d.pdf.  In fact, whether the defendant violated a scien-
ter-based provision of securities laws is a key factor in SEC waiver determinations.
86 Bressman, supra note 30, at 1691 (“When agencies provide explanations for their
nonenforcement decisions, they hinder improper influences from dominating those deci-
sions at public expense.”).
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constituencies.”87  None of these were announced publicly, allowing the
agency to plausibly deny that any change has taken place.
B. Remedies for a Lack of Accountability
Under federal administrative law, categorical abdications of enforce-
ment are subject to judicial review under Heckler v. Chaney88 for violations of
the Administrative Procedure Act, but case-by-case decisions not to enforce
are not.  Low-priority enforcement falls in between, in that (1) in the absence
of a smoking-gun public document, one cannot prove that the agency abdi-
cated its responsibility to enforce the law, and thus one cannot show that the
agency did so for arbitrary reasons; and (2) a shift to low-priority enforce-
ment may be within agency discretion and thus not subject to judicial review.
There is no reason in constitutional or administrative law to treat discre-
tionary policy choices differently depending on whether they result in an
increase or a decrease in enforcement.  Both raise similar questions about
fair notice and due process, and about the separation of powers.  We demand
that agencies give reasons for changes in rules.  Reason giving seems appro-
priate for significant shifts in enforcement in order to match given reasons
with observed enforcement practices and to subject those reasons to political
scrutiny through media coverage and congressional attention, even when
judicial review is not available or appropriate.
Lumping patterns of nonenforcement with nonreviewable case-by-case
decisions presents several risks.  A change on a large scale in a short amount
of time significantly changes the de facto legal compliance obligations for a
large segment of the financial industry.  Since Clayton took over the reins at
the SEC, only “real fraud” is truly prohibited—think The Wolf of Wall Street—
while more sophisticated types of fraud and other serious violations of the
securities laws fly under the radar.  That change occurred rapidly and largely
out of the public eye, even though defendants surely understand the
changed landscape.
Whatever the reason for the change, it should not matter from a deter-
rence perspective or from the separation of powers perspective: a pattern of
nonenforcement may be difficult to distinguish from the categorical nonen-
forcement that courts have held is akin to a rule change.  If so, it should be
evaluated under similar standards.  If not, agencies have an incentive to move
lawmaking from more transparent rulemaking to nonenforcement,89 and to
move enforcement policies from more public categorical pronouncements to
quiet policy changes.  If that is the case, the upshot is that small, discrete, but
well-connected minorities will consistently benefit, whereas nonenforcement
directed at a more diffuse class of subjects will be reviewed under a more
stringent standard.
87 Price, supra note 21, at 687.
88 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
89 See generally Deacon, supra note 14.
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Subjecting patterns of nonenforcement to judicial review would involve
difficult line-drawing questions.  The district court in Texas v. United States90
classified President Obama’s DAPA program fairly easily as “affirmative action
rather than inaction.”91  When is a change in enforcement, absent a public
declaration, sufficient?  Should such changes be reviewed like rules, implying
that unless the change went through a notice-and-comment process, it is ille-
gal?  Or should enforcement changes be treated like case-by-case agency deci-
sions, which courts review to ensure that they are based on substantial
evidence?  It also raises questions about remedies.  The Texas v. United States
court enjoined the program.  An injunction ordering an agency to enforce
the law may itself be unenforceable.  The agency can always claim the change
is a result of budget constraints or the fact that no violations were discovered.
Institutional reform litigation could serve as a model for judicial intervention
against nonenforcement, but raises significant separation of powers
concerns.92
Alternatively, a better approach would be to insist that all significant pol-
icy choices in enforcement be disclosed, so that they can be contested.  The
best remedy for excessive crackdowns or gaps in enforcement is not judicial
but political.  Clear legislative guidelines and mechanisms by which the legis-
lature can police enforcement deviations and more honest reporting of
enforcement activities may be the better approach.93  When agency discre-
tion is overbroad the burden lies clearly on Congress.
Similarly, to preserve a semblance of symmetry in enforcement and non-
enforcement actions, the rule of lenity should be read narrowly, applying
only when no reasonable person would believe that the violation was outside
the scope of the prohibition.  The victims have no analogous right, and rea-
sonable interpretations of a vague statute satisfy fair notice, even without pre-
cedent directly on point.  Congress may always intervene if it believes
reasonable interpretations are beyond the scope of the statute.
Congressional oversight as proposed here may be of limited effectiveness
during periods of unified government, but honest agency reporting has
promise.  Agencies are already required to report to Congress considerable
amounts of information about their activities, including on enforcement.94
But their incentives are biased.  They choose the enforcement metrics that
they report, and so they use the ones that are more easily manipulated.95
90 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 645 (S.D. Tex. 2015), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by
an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam).
91 Id. at 654.
92 For example, a court could appoint a receiver to oversee the enforcement program.
See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976) (discussing class action litigation that aims to enforce public constitutional
and statutory law).
93 See Sohoni, supra note 80, at 91–92.
94 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285
(codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, and 22 U.S.C.).
95 See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statis-
tics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 972–74 (2016).
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Rather than disclose reports, disclosing raw data and outsourcing analysis to
the crowd might be more productive and certainly more transparent.  The
SEC, for example, already makes available all public company financial dis-
closures that it receives.  In fact, it requires issuers to tag disclosures, so as to
facilitate empirical research.96  Agencies could do the same with their
enforcement data.  The public interest in such information is considerable.97
CONCLUSION
Administrative law does not impose substantial constraints on agencies’
ability to significantly change enforcement priorities with each change of
administration.  That is generally as it should be: it keeps courts out of policy
choices and allows for flexibility in setting enforcement priorities that may be
necessary in light of changed circumstances, such as a series of scandals.
At the same time, discretion can swallow the rule of law.  Swift and large
changes in enforcement policy mean the rule that people face means one
thing under one administration and another under the administration that
follows.  Worse still, the change occurs quickly, undermining any investments
and reliance expectations by those affected.  There ought to be some con-
straint on enforcement discretion but, as discussed in this Article, the con-
straint is not and, generally, should not be judicial.  Rather, congressional
oversight and media scrutiny may be the better avenues for accountability.
96 Researching Public Companies Through EDGAR: A Guide for Investors, SEC, https://
www.sec.gov/oiea/Article/edgarguide.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2018) (“The SEC requires
public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the public,
which provides a public source for all investors to use to judge for themselves if a com-
pany’s securities are a good investment.”).
97 See, e.g., Renae Merle, Wall Street’s Watchdog Is Pursuing Fewer Cases Since Trump Took
Office, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/
2017/11/23/wall-streets-watchdog-is-pursuing-fewer-cases-since-trump-took-office/?utm_
term=.50a7dccbfd4a; Dave Michaels, Wall Street Fines Fall During First Year of Trump Adminis-
tration, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-street-fines-fall-dur-
ing-first-year-of-trump-administration-research-shows-1510655400 (referencing research
reported in this Article).
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